A Cost-Benefit Analysis of an Olympic Games by Darren McHugh
QED
Queen’s Economics Department Working Paper No. 1097












A COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 










An essay submitted to the Department of Economics 
 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for  
 


























To the heterodox economists 
 
whose writings kept me sane.  
Table of Contents 
Introduction......................................................................................................................... 1 
Section 1 - Project Scope, Scale, and Integration in Olympic CBA................................... 7 
Categorizing the Vancouver 2010 Olympic Infrastructure Projects............................. 14 
Section 2 - Valuing the Spectacle..................................................................................... 17 
Estimation of the demand curve for the in-person spectacle........................................ 18 
Interpreting the area under the demand curve............................................................... 23 
Additional considerations............................................................................................. 25 
Conclusion: valuing the in-person spectacle................................................................. 30 
Valuing the gross benefit of the televised Olympic spectacle...................................... 35 
Section 3 – The “Olympic Halo”: The Measurement of Non-Use Values of the Olympics
........................................................................................................................................... 37 
Section 4 – “Economic Impact” and the Correct Valuation of Secondary Market Effects 
in Olympic CBA............................................................................................................... 40 
Is all surplus in primary markets already being measured?.......................................... 42 
Price changes in secondary market............................................................................... 43 
Distortions in secondary markets.................................................................................. 45 
Measuring secondary surplus generated by Olympic tourism – general approach ...... 46 
Secondary surplus for tourist activity during the Games.............................................. 48 
Secondary surplus for tourist activity before/after the Games...................................... 55 
Conclusion – net benefits of tourism............................................................................ 56 
Section 5 - Are the Olympics a Worthwhile Public Project?............................................ 58 
Event Costs................................................................................................................... 59 





Every two years, the International Olympic Committee convenes to select the next 
host city for a Summer or Winter Olympic Games, and these decisions are preceded by 
strenuous marketing efforts by candidate cities anxious to land the Games.  The economic 
virtues of hosting the event are loudly extolled by those who are endeavouring to hold it, 
but from a correct economic cost-benefit analysis (CBA
1) perspective, does an Olympic 
Games generate positive net benefits for the host nation? 
The evaluation of the “Olympic Project” (for lack of a better term) is unique in 
the number of challenges it poses for the practitioner of CBA.    
One interesting problem is the complexity and interdependence of the various 
activities required.  Hosting the Olympics is not merely a public project, it is many public 
projects.  Venues must be built.  Infrastructure must be improved.  Housing must be 
provided.  Projects which might have happened anyway are redesigned or rescheduled in 
order to accommodate the Games.  All of these capital investments have benefits besides 
that of enabling the city to host the Games.  How should the costs and benefits of holding 
the Games themselves be distinguished from the costs and benefits of the capital 
investments required to hold them?  
Another interesting problem is that many of the most important advertised 
benefits of holding the Olympic Games are extraordinarily difficult to quantify.  What is 
the benefit of “increased international visibility”?  It may certainly lead to an increase in 
tourist visits and tourist expenditure, but is there a net benefit from this increased 
tourism?  What is “the pride of hosting the Games” worth?  If the investments in the 
                                                 
1 Throughout the document, the ‘CBA’ acronym will be used interchangeably to refer to the process of 
cost-benefit analysis, and as a generic label for any study which contains cost-benefit techniques. 2 
facilities for the Games lead to greater successes for national amateur athletes in the 
future, what’s that worth?   The questions are endless. 
In short, the quantification of the costs and benefits of holding the Olympics 
touches upon almost every aspect of CBA theory. 
It is rather surprising to this author that a methodologically correct and complete 
Cost/Benefit analysis for such a large, visible, and important undertaking seems never to 
have been attempted.  The more typical approach by Games proponents is to conduct an 
ex ante ‘economic impact study’, such as the one written by the BC Government Capital 
Projects Branch (2002) (and updated in Intervistas (2002))
 2 for the 2010 Games in 
Vancouver.  This study contains a wealth of information and analysis, but unfortunately 
differs from a Cost/Benefit analysis in several important ways which this paper will 
explore.   
The Canadian Center for Policy Alternatives (CCPA, 2003) used data from 
Intervistas to create the outline of a “Multiple Account Evaluation” (MAE).  This form of 
study approaches costs and benefits in a spirit more in keeping with that of true CBA, but 
places these costs and benefits in different “evaluation accounts” (such as ‘government 
financial’ , ‘resident/consumer’, ‘environmental’, ‘economic development’ and ‘social’) 
rather than unifying them under a single perspective (as CBA would do).  An MAE also 
permits the analyst to avoid monetizing any hard-to-monetize cost or benefit, instead 
leaving the entries of different accounts in incompatible units where desired and 
explicitly leaving the reader with the task of weighing ‘apples and oranges’.  As befits 
their ‘opposition’ perspective, the CCPA study also neglected the non-Olympic benefits 
                                                 
2 Both the BC Government and Intervistas expressly acknowledge that their documents are not attempts at 
Cost/Benefit analysis and should not be read as such. 3 
of Games-related capital expenditures, which led to an understatement of the net benefits 
of the Games. 
The most complete ex post study of a Games is usually the Official Report 
released for the Games.  Unfortunately, the economic analysis in this document is really a 
financial analysis, which considers costs and benefits from the point of view of the 
organizing committee rather than society as a whole.  Using such an analysis, which 
explicitly treats direct government contributions as revenue and ignores any capital cost 
not incurred by the organizing committee,  the Official Report for the XV Winter 
Olympic Games in Calgary (1988) concluded that the games had made a ‘profit’ of $30 
million dollars.  
To correct all of these shortcomings and create a complete and correct CBA of an 
Olympic Games (either ex ante for an upcoming Games or ex post for a completed 
Games) would be a heroic task.  However, this paper will attempt, in the context of the 
upcoming 2010 Winter Olympics in Vancouver/Whistler, to rigorously address a 
representative cross-section of those topics that should be found in a full blown Olympic 
CBA, including: 
1.  Dealing with project dependency via a framework for the classification of costs 
and benefits into the categories of “event specific” and “infrastructure related” 
2.  Rules for identification and treatment of “related” infrastructure projects 
3.  Evaluating the net benefit of “the Olympic Spectacle” 
4.  Evaluating the net benefit of the pride engendered by the Games for local citizens, 
which we might call “the Olympic Halo”  
5.  Valuing the net benefit (not economic impact) of induced Olympic Tourism 4 
Primary sources of estimates for the 2010 Games are the Bid Book which VANOC 
(the Vancouver Olympic Committee) was required to submit to the IOC, the Intervistas 
paper referred to above, and the Auditor General (2002) review of the Games estimates.  
The comparison of ex ante estimates and ex post data from a completed Olympics (such 
as the 1988 Calgary Winter Games) would have permitted additional lines of inquiry, 
particularly the investigation of any systematic underestimation of capital construction 
costs or tourist visits.  However, for space reasons, this paper will not concern itself with 
those issues; all published estimates for the 2010 Games will be taken at face value.  The 
focus of this paper is the accurate conceptual treatment of the data, not the accuracy of 
the data itself. 
The paper will, however, combine conclusions drawn in each of its sections above 
with published estimates to produce a modified “bottom line” for the 2010 Winter Games 
which is more in line with what a full blown CBA study would produce. 
To do so, it is necessary to consider the timing of expenditures and realized benefits.  
Correct discounting and treatment of inflation must be applied to each of the individual 
costs and benefits in order to permit a meaningful assessment of the project as a whole.  
When using estimates prepared by others (as this paper attempts to do), an additional 
difficulty arises, as it is necessary to understand what assumptions regarding discounting 
and inflation are already embodied in those estimates, and what additional manipulations 
are required to make them consistent and correct for use in a CBA framework.
3   
All financial values quoted in the paper are in 2002 Canadian dollars.  The Bid Book 
is mandated by the IOC to contain estimates in 2002 US dollars.  The Bid Committee 
                                                 
3 This interpretation can be particularly difficult when using estimates which were not prepared with CBA 
in mind. 5 
used an exchange rate of 1.55 CAD/USD to convert their original CAD estimates to US 
dollars, and to recover those original estimates this paper has used the same exchange 
rate to convert back to Canadian dollars (except where otherwise noted).  Generally, the 
estimates which are drawn from sources other than the Bid Book are generally already 
consistent with the Bid Book with respect to inflation, and this paper will perform little 
extra manipulation in that regard. 
Discounting is more problematic. Generally the estimates used here were not 
generated with any discounting methodology at all; therefore, wherever possible, this 
paper identifies the timing of costs and benefits, and discounts them to reflect present 
values as of 2010, using a discount rate of 10%. 
Finally, as in any CBA, it is important to define the point of view the analysis will 
take.  The question of point of view in CBA is also known as the question of standing.  
Only those people whose preferences are deemed relevant to the CBA have standing, 
while the impacts on others, whether positive or negative, are ignored.  Maintaining a 
consistent point of view is essential for any correct CBA, and doubly so for a project such 
as the Olympics, with large size, substantial tourism impacts, and multiple levels of 
government involvement. 
Olympic advocates often prefer to look at the Games from the provincial perspective, 
the regional perspective, or even the private perspective, 
4 and these points of view are 
conceptually consistent even if they are almost universally frowned upon by CBA 
advocates in practice.  This paper will follow generally accepted CBA practice in viewing 
all costs and benefits from the national perspective, and make all necessary corrections to 
                                                 
4 Using the private perspective renders CBA indistinguishable from standard financial accounting – indeed, 
CBA has often been described simply as ‘project accounting from a national perspective’. 
 6 
existing data and estimates which, at least for the 2010 Games in Vancouver, are entirely 
conducted from a provincial point of view. 7 
Section 1 - Project Scope, Scale, and Integration in 
Olympic CBA 
As mentioned in the Introduction, the Olympic Project does not consist of a single 
project, but is a bewildering array of associated public projects, each with costs and 
benefits.  The benefits of all of these associated projects are often ascribed to the 
Olympics, such that it is said that the Olympics will “leave a legacy” of improved housing 
and transit infrastructure.  But is this accurate?  In order to answer this question, the 
analyst must: 
•  Clearly identify the scope of the “Olympic project” 
•  If any related projects are necessary for the Olympic project but have benefits 
even without the Olympics, rules must be developed to a)identify those projects 
and b)attribute their costs and benefits to the Olympics. 
The Olympics is not just one project but many – it’s an integrated project.  The 
conventional CBA practice, as described in Jenkins (Cambridge 2004), for dealing with 
integrated projects is to identify the components which generate negative returns, drop 
those components, and proceed with the project configuration which generates the 
highest NPV. 
However, this simple approach neglects project dependency.  It is not generally 
possible to drop any arbitrary subset of projects from the Olympic portfolio of projects.  
You can have roads and stadiums without the Olympics, but you generally cannot have 
the Olympics without new roads and stadiums.
5  
                                                 
5 Optimal Project Scale refers to the idea that a project can be different sizes.  There are readily available 
techniques in CBA to ‘pick the right scale for the project’, i.e. the scale that maximizes NPV.   It could be 
argued that the proper goal of this exercise would be to find the optimal size (in terms of level of 
surrounding infrastructure) of an Olympic Games (choosing from such scenarios as “none”, “modest”, 8 
The first challenge for the CBA analyst is to correctly distinguish the boundaries of 
the analysis.  Our interest here is a CBA study of holding the Games, not a study of 
building roads or stadiums.   
What does it mean to “hold the Games”?  For the purposes of this paper, “Holding the 
Games” is the act of inviting world-class athletes, television crews, and tourists to your 
city for two weeks to compete.  
The ‘definition’ of holding the Games above immediately suggests a useful 
categorization of the costs and benefits.  The ‘benefits’ of the Olympics can be 
subdivided into Event Benefits and Infrastructure Benefits.  The former are those benefits 
which are only attained if the Olympics are held.  (That is, are only attained if athletes 
and media are invited to the city for two weeks of athletic competition).  Plainly, direct 
benefits such as ticket sales, ‘national pride’, Olympic tourism, and Olympic merchandise 
sales fit into this category. 
Many of the other touted benefits of the Olympics, such as ‘improved roads’, and 
‘better housing’ can be had without ‘inviting the world’, and thus should be considered as 
‘Infrastructure Benefits’.    
The definition of ‘Event Costs’ will be all of those costs which are necessary to attain 
the Event Benefits, but not necessary to attain the ‘Infrastructure Benefits’.  Security 
costs and marketing costs fit into this category.  Other costs can be termed ‘Infrastructure 
Costs’.   
                                                                                                                                                 
“moderate”, and “gargantuan”), and that it is unfair to dismiss the idea of holding an Olympics because of 
the negative NPV for a particular Games, as some other size of Games might have had a positive NPV.  
However, in practice, the question of ‘optimal scale’ for the Olympics is probably moot - if the planned 
Games are not the size that the IOC wants them to be, they will be awarded to another city.  It is certainly 
probable that the IOC’s size preferences are motivated more by political considerations than by sound CBA 
technique, but in any event they should be considered as an exogenous variable in this analysis; the planned 
Games are as big as they need to be in order to win the bidding process, and cannot be any other size.  The 
question this paper will consider then, is: ‘to hold the Games at the scale that the IOC prefers, or not?’ 9 
 
Figure 1:  Event and Infrastructure Costs/Benefits 
The following table uses this taxonomy to enumerate all the associated costs and 
benefits.  Some of these costs and benefits, notably the “Olympic Halo” referred to 

















(not related to Event) 
Costs  Projects  Benefits 
Support Project Services (i.e. 
use of venues) 10 
Event Costs 
 
• Bid costs 
• Security 
• Congestion externalities 
• Administrative costs 
• Translation costs 
• Promotion (i.e.: the torch relay) 
• Advertising 





The Olympic Spectacle 
• Viewing pleasure of ticket audience 
• Television Spectacle (translates into 
TV revenue) 
 
• “Promotion of sporty lifestyles” 
• Positive externality accruing to 
Olympic Athletes who compete in their 
home country. 
• Housing services for athletes during the 
games.  (since most of them don’t have 
standing and are only housed for a short 
time, this can likely be ignored). 
 
Induced secondary effects of direct outputs 
• Stimulated tourism demand (also a 
secondary effect of Halo) 
 
Primary effects of Halo 
• “Pride” externality accruing to citizens 
of the host city/province/nation. 
• Surplus accruing to volunteers who 
enjoy the experience 
 
Intangible Secondary Effects of Halo 
• “Cachet services” (i.e. – sponsorship, 
sales of commemorative coins) 
Infrastructure Costs 
 
• Construction of housing 
• Construction of supporting transit 
infrastructure (transit lines, highways) 
• Construction of venues 
Infrastructure Benefits (Benefits that 
could be realized simply by building the 
infrastructure and not holding the 
Games at all) 
 
• Future social housing 
• Future athlete use of infrastructure 
• Future public use of infrastructure 
• Future transit use 
Table 1: A Taxonomy of Olympic Costs and Benefits 
 
The handling of Event Costs and Event Benefits is obvious enough (they should 
be charged directly to the Games), but what about the infrastructure costs and benefits?  
As mentioned, an easy (and common) conceptual mistake is to conflate the benefits of the 11 
Games themselves with the benefits of the associated infrastructure projects. From the 
point of view of evaluating the Games project itself, this is incorrect: the benefits of the 
infrastructure could be realized by building the infrastructure alone (perhaps with a 
different design or schedule) and not holding the Games at all.   On the other hand, the 
costs and benefits of the Infrastructure Projects cannot simply be ignored either, since the 
benefits of the Event project cannot be realized without the infrastructure project.  How is 
this to be approached? 
In CBA methodology, any cost (such as the Infrastructure Costs described above) 
which cannot be associated with a single project is called a joint cost, also known as a 
non-separable cost.  The published CBA guidelines of California Transit
6 have the 
following to say on the subject of joint and sunk costs (in the context of transportation 
projects): 
“There is no theoretically correct basis for allocating non-
separable costs. However whatever method is used should stand 
the tests of reasonableness and fairness. ...Reasonable approaches 
include allocating joint costs in proportion to other costs, in 
proportion to benefits, or in proportion to some combination of 
these.” 
 
However, since the Olympic Event is dependent upon the Infrastructure projects 
(but not vice versa), the following is a suggested categorization of Infrastructure projects.  
Each category of infrastructure project should have a different method of accounting. 
Each project can be categorized on the basis of two questions: 
•  Was it worth building anyway?  (i.e.: would the project have had a positive NPV 
without the Olympics) 
                                                 
6 http://www.dot.ca.gov/hq/tpp/offices/ote/Benefit_Cost/calculations/joint_sunk.html 12 
•  Would it have been built anyway?  (i.e.: would it have been built given the 
existing decision making structure that exists in government at that time) 
From these two questions, four separate categories of infrastructure projects can be 
devised: 
1.  Infrastructure projects that would have been built (and were worth building) with the 
same design and schedule, even without the Olympic Bid.  If a project would have been 
built even without the Olympics, the Olympic project cannot take the credit (or the 
blame) for the project’s other successes. The cost of using these facilities should be 
evaluated at their opportunity cost – that is, the highest value use foregone as the result of 
the Games.  
This category likely includes facilities already built when the Games are 
announced, but specifically does not include infrastructure that was built for the purpose 
of attracting the Games.  (This is necessarily a subjective judgment).  It has been 
speculated that some cities may engage in signaling behaviour in the period leading-up to 
the bid, building infrastructure which would not otherwise be built in the hopes of 
attracting the Games.
7   It is plain that this dynamic was in effect in Calgary.  The Official 
Report of the Calgary Games (1988) explicitly states: “The fact that (the Calgary 
Olympic Saddledome) was already being built added credibility to the bid and proved to 
be a positive factor in demonstrating Calgary’s commitment to hosting the Games.  
Construction of the Saddledome was initiated by the desire to have a state-of-the-art 
arena under construction in order to enhance its Olympic bid...” 
                                                 
7 See Macho-Stadler & Perez-Castrillo, An Introduction to the Economics of Information, 2nd ed., Oxford 
University Press 2001.   13 
2.  Infrastructure projects that would not have been built without the Olympic Bid 
attempt, and were not otherwise worth building.   
In this case, the full difference between the non-Olympic project benefits and the 
project costs (which is negative by definition for projects which are not worth building 
without the Olympic Games) should be charged as a cost of the Olympics.  Conceptually, 
this is identical to the treatment it would get if both its costs and benefits were simply 
considered ‘part of the Olympics’. 
This category implicitly includes infrastructure projects for which the non-
Olympic benefits are zero, in which case the project is simply treated as though it were an 
Event Cost.  This category also includes those projects for which the non-Olympic 
operating costs exceed the non-Olympic operating benefits (in which case the 
infrastructure should be torn down after the Games).  If this is not done due to political 
difficulties, the negative NPV of the project if it had been torn down should be charged to 
the Olympics, rather than the actual NPV of the project.   
3.  Infrastructure projects which were worth building even without the games (have a 
positive NPV even when considering only non-Olympic benefits), but would not have 
been built without the Olympics.  
The Games are often touted as a way to ‘get things built’.  If the Games provide a 
spur to build projects that are legitimately worthwhile from a national point of view but 
are not built due to government failure, then there is some merit to this categorization, in 
which case the surplus generated by such projects should be counted as another benefit of 
the Olympics.  Referring to the earlier discussion of standing, the author believes that the 14 
more likely scenario is that the Olympics are a way to ‘get projects built’ which are only 
worthwhile from a subnational, rather than national, perspective.  
4.  Infrastructure projects which are built with a different design, schedule or location that 
they otherwise would have been, due to the Games.   
From a CBA perspective, a change in the design, schedule or location of an 
infrastructure project implies a change in the stream of costs and benefits of the project, 
and a corresponding change (likely a decrease) in the NPV.  The difference between the 
NPV of the original project and the new one should be charged to the Olympic project.   
Categorizing the Vancouver 2010 Olympic Infrastructure Projects 
The infrastructure projects for an Olympic Games consist of transportation, 
housing, and athletic facility construction and/or improvements.  This paper does not 
attempt the rigorous analysis of each project necessary to apply the categorization above, 
but some of the major projects of the Vancouver Games, their costs, and observations 
about their expected non-Olympic utility are listed below.  No detailed data about the 
expected timing of capital expenditures is available, making correct discounting 
problematic.  The implications of this will be revisited in the final section of the paper. 
Transportation Projects 
There are two major transportation infrastructure projects underway in the Vancouver 
area: 
•  The upgrade to the Vancouver/Whistler highway (a $600m project in 2002 
dollars) is a project whose schedule is expressly motivated by the Olympics, and 
its costs are included in the Bid Book.  Approaches to this project have ranged 
from “ignore its impact on the Olympic Games” (the Bid Book), to “charge its 15 
cost to the Games but ignore all non-Olympic project benefits” (CCPA 2002).  
Neither approach is correct: this project should likely be categorized as “worth 
building, but would have been built to a different schedule without the Games”.  
•  In contrast to the highway upgrade, the Airport/Vancouver rapid transit line 
(approximately $1.9bn in 2003 dollars)
8 is ostensibly not an “Olympic project” 
(and therefore would not normally merit consideration in a CBA study of the 
Olympic Games).  However, Redlin (2003) has expressed concern that the 
compressed planning of this project to allow for (and perhaps justify) completion 
of the project before the Games has led to suboptimal financing and planning 
decisions.  If borne out by further analysis, these “hidden costs” should rightly be 
included as costs in Olympic CBA. 
Athletic Venues 
The Olympic Bid book indicates the capital budget for athletic venues for the 
Vancouver Olympics is $366m (2002 CDN).  It seems probable that many of these 
venues will have limited utility after the Games compared to their sometimes lavish costs, 
and would therefore be categorized as “not worth building, and would not have been built 
without the Games.”
9, such that the entire difference between their construction cost and 
their (minimal) non-Olympic uses would be charged as a cost of the Games. 
Housing 
The Olympic Bid book indicates the capital budget for athletic venues for the 
Vancouver Olympics is $265m (2002 CDN).  As housing costs are extremely high in 
both Vancouver and Whistler, it seems probable that the non-Games related utility of this 
                                                 
8 http://www.ravprapidtransit.com/aboutFinancing.asp 
9 Even the value of these facilities for training future Canadian Olympic athletes is greatly limited by the 
fact that identical facilities already exist in Calgary! 16 
housing will be substantial, such that the difference between their construction cost and 
their non-Olympic uses would only contribute minimally to an overall CBA of the 
Games. 17 
Section 2 - Valuing the Spectacle 
Recall from the introduction that one of the primary outputs of an Olympic 
Games is the spectacle itself.  This section will attempt to estimate the WTP (that is, the 
gross benefit) of the Vancouver Olympic spectacle
10.  This spectacle may be viewed 
either in-person or on television, and the WTP for the two experiences will be considered 
separately.   
The revenue generated from ticket sales is easily estimated and is commonly 
included in estimates of “economic impact” of the Olympics, but of course it is not 
conceptually correct to use project revenue as the measure of gross social surplus, unless 
none of the consumers of the project output have standing in the analysis (i.e. the project 
creates a good intended solely for export).  The conceptually correct measure of gross 
benefit is the area under the demand curve, therefore the actual gross benefit is generally 
greater than the ticket revenue alone.  If we imagine differently-priced ticket categories 
for a particular Olympic event, the gross benefit of the spectacle of a particular Olympic 
event could be represented in the familiar diagram of Figure 2 below as the sum of the 
grey areas (ticket revenue) and the white areas (consumer surplus).  (As will be 
discussed, the demand curve for Olympic tickets need not touch the edges of the ‘revenue 
areas’). 
                                                 
10 This will include all Olympic sporting events and the opening/closing ceremonies, but not include the 
Paralympic Games or Olympic medal ceremonies. 18 
 
Figure 2: Revenue and Consumer Surplus for Olympic Tickets 
 
Ordinarily, valuing this project output would merely consist of estimating demand 
curves for each event, and tallying the combined surplus for all events.  However, there 
are some additional complexities imposed by the Olympics, which affect a) the 
estimation of the demand curve and b) the interpretation of the area under it.  
Estimation of the demand curve for the in-person spectacle 
According to Boardman, most practical techniques of demand curve estimation 
start with a direct observation of the actual price P and quantity Q (which is assumed to 
be market-clearing for the market under study), some assumption regarding functional 
form for the demand curve (such as linear, constant elasticity, etc), and then some 
estimates of elasticity or other points on the curve derived from observations of “similar” 
markets.  These estimates, along with the direct observation of P and Q, can be 
algebraically plugged into the chosen functional form
11.   
                                                 
11 Of course, if a sufficient number of market clearing price and quantity observations for this market are 
available, econometric techniques can be used instead. 19 
The first impediment to obtaining market-clearing price/quantity information for 
Vancouver Olympic tickets is that ticket prices and buying policies have not yet been set 
for those Games.  However, numbers of tickets available for each event and estimates of 
overall revenue are available.  In addition, ticket prices (in Euros) from the Turin 2006 
Winter Games are available, and these prices can be used as a gauge of the relative prices 
of tickets at the Vancouver Games.
12  Combined with the other data available for the 
Vancouver Games, individual ticket prices can then be estimated.  
This information alone, however, will not allow us to observe true market-
clearing prices and quantities for Olympic tickets. The supply of tickets and their official 
selling price is fixed in advance (and is often driven by the political urge to make tickets 
“affordable”), therefore the marginal benefit of the last ticket sold may well exceed the 
official selling price.   
An alternative source of data which would better reflect actual valuations would 
be the prices collected in the aftermarket (i.e.: “scalping”).  Reliable historical data series 
for aftermarket prices in each Olympic event and ticket category would obviously make 
the valuation task much easier, but unsurprisingly given the generally illicit nature of 
these markets, such data is difficult to come by and is largely anecdotal and thus 
unreliable.    
In the absence of reliable aftermarket data, the points on the demand curve for 
Olympic tickets will need to be estimated relative to official (observable) ticket prices.  
This process is complicated by official ticket bundling policies.  These can and do vary 
from Games to Games: for the most recent Games, the Turin Winter Games in 2006, 
events were categorized by the organizers as “type 1” (high expected demand) and “type 
                                                 
12 All Turin policy and price information in this section is from UK Sportsworld (2005). 20 
2” (low expected demand), and every type 1 ticket buyer was required to purchase a type 
2 ticket as well (type 2 ticket purchases were unrestricted).   
The implication of this policy is that not only can we not assume the prices and 
quantities purchased clear the market, we cannot even assume that the willingness to pay 
for “type 2” events is above the price paid, even if the event is ostensibly sold out!   (This 
is supported by anecdotal evidence (Isidore 2002) of widespread secondary market 
activity at the Salt Lake City Games in 2002, where nearly every single event was “sold 
out”, yet aftermarket tickets were available for well below cost.)  For this reason, whether 
or not an event ‘sells out’ or not will not be used to judge the actually popularity of the 
event. 
As the ticket bundling policy for the Vancouver Games is not yet set, an 
assumption will be made for those Games:  only international buyers are forced to 
purchase a type 2 ticket for each type 1 ticket purchased
13.  While such a policy requires 
that official ticket sales be limited to licensed agents who can attempt to restrict sales 
geographically, ticket resale between foreigners and Canadians will likely occur 
nonetheless, and the economic impact of this activity is discussed later in this section.   
No figure for proportion of tickets sold to internationals (either estimated or 
actual) has been published, as once again, most figures for the Calgary Olympics (actual) 
or the Vancouver Olympics (estimated) take the subnational perspective, breaking down 
the number of visitors as in-province or out-of-province.  According to the Calgary 
                                                 
13 The assumption that this restriction is limited to international buyers only is motivated by two simple 
considerations:. First, given the seating capacities for the 2010 Games venues, and assuming that the same 
Type 1/Type 2 event categorizations used in the 2006 Games were used in the 2010 Games, there are 
actually more Type 1 than Type 2 tickets at the Vancouver 2010 Games, making it impossible to impose 
this ticket buying scheme on every ticket purchaser.  This also appears to have been the policy in Turin – 
there is no mention in the Turin Olympic literature of local buyers facing the type 1/type 2 ticket purchase 
requirement. 21 
OCOG (1989), in Calgary the visitors were 77% Albertans, while a visitor survey quoted 
in Intervistas (2002) reported 31% of the others were other Canadians (i.e. 7%), implying 
16% were foreigners.  Intervistas (2002) also estimates that 70% of ticket buyers will be 
from British Columbia.  Using the 31% figure above implies 10% of the visitors would 
be other Canadians, for a total breakdown of 80% Canadian and 20% foreign.  However, 
given that all foreign visitors to the Olympics have both sufficient income and sufficient 
interest in the Games to make the trip in the first place, it is reasonable to assume that on 
average they would buy more tickets than locals, which perhaps implies that only 70% of 
all tickets will be sold to Canadians, with 30% sold to foreigners.   
With these preliminaries out of the way, we are ready to start estimating some 
demand curves.  Firstly, a simple linear demand curve will be assumed.  Given the 
uncertain nature of the other estimates here this is unlikely to be a significant source of 
error. 
Anecdotal data for aftermarket prices obtained for tickets to popular events at 
previous Games suggests that a reasonable estimate for the highest WTP for a ticket 
would be 50% above the official price for Type 1 events, while the lowest WTP for a 




Figure 3: Estimated demand Curve for Type 1 (high demand) events, relative to revenue 
 
What about type 2 events?  If we assume that part of the demand curve for these 
events is below the price paid, the number of buyers whose WTP is below the price they 
actually pay can be no more than the proportion of foreign ticket buyers, as they are the 
ones constrained by the bundling scheme.   
We also know (since some of the foreign buyers may be purchasing type 2 tickets 
‘under duress’) that the proportion of foreign buyers may be higher in the type 2 ticket 
market than the type 1 ticket market.  If the overall proportion of tickets sold to 
foreigners is 30% (as previously estimated), we can assume 25% of type 1 tickets are sold 
to foreigners and 35% of type 2 tickets are sold to foreigners.  However, 35% is an upper 
bound on the portion of the demand curve below the price in Figure 4 below, as some of 
the foreign type 2 ticket buyers actually do have a positive willingness to pay.  We may 
assume the total proportion (out of the 35% of buyers who are foreign) which is below 
the line is 25%.  For the other end of the demand curve, we may assume that peak WTP 
is 15% above the price
14.  The end result would be as shown in Figure 4.  No attempt is 
                                                 
14 It may be argued, that since all the athletes competing in type 2 events have parents and relatives who 
presumably have a very high willingness to pay (even if nobody else does), that this estimate of peak 
willingness to pay as 15% over the price is too low.  To anticipate the next section, since these relatives are 
predominantly foreign by definition (since most athletes competing in the games are foreign), their surplus 
is not included in the analysis and can be ignored. 23 
being made to estimate the region of the demand curve below P, for reasons which will 
be clear. 
    
Figure 4: Estimation of demand curve for Type 2 (low demand) events 
 
Interpreting the area under the demand curve 
It is also important to note that not all ticket buyers have standing in the analysis. 
This is a challenging situation for conventional CBA techniques to address.  Olympic 
tickets are not a non-traded good (since foreigners consume it as well) but the 
conventional treatment of tradable goods in CBA relies on the existence of a world price, 
which doesn’t apply in this situation. 
For type 1 events, where the foreigner is not constrained, the approach that will be 
followed here is to discount a portion of surplus (above revenue) from the estimate equal 
to the proportion of foreigners in that market. This method assumes that the WTP of the 
average foreign ticket buyer is the same as the WTP of the average domestic buyer.
15   
When interpreting the area under the “type 2” demand curve, it can be seen that 
the “ticket-bundling” policy is really a mechanism for extracting additional surplus from 
foreign ticket purchasers.  If a ticket buyer with standing in the analysis were “forced” 
                                                 
15 Given that the foreigner has signalled a relatively high income and enthusiasm for the Games by making 
the trip in the first place, this assumption may be dubious. 24 
(by their own strong desire to purchase a “Type 1” ticket) to pay $20 for a Type 2 ticket 
which is only worth $16 to them, the gross social benefit represented by that particular 
transaction is still just $16 ($20 in revenue to the local Olympic Organizing committee, 
$4 in lost surplus for the buyer).  However, this situation will never arise given our ticket 
bundling assumptions.  On the other hand, if an international buyer (without standing) is 
similarly “forced” to buy a Type 2 ticket, their lost surplus ($4) is irrelevant, and the 
revenue ($20) for the organizing committee can be used as the gross benefit (in other 
words an additional amount of their surplus from type 1 events is captured by the local 
Olympic organizers).
16 
This implies that all of the grey triangle above the demand curve for type 2 tickets 
should be counted, as shown in Figure 5 below.  Meanwhile, if foreigners with WTP 
below price represent 25% of the type 2 ticket market (which has 35% foreign 
participation in total), then of then 75% of the type 2 demand curve is above the price, of 
which 65/75ths (~87%) represents local ticket buyers and should be counted.   
 
Figure 5: Interpreting Consumer Surplus for Type 1 and Type 2 Olympic Events 
                                                 
16 Tickets, hotels, and airfare are often bundled together by tour operators in one package, but as the 
purchasers of such packages will be overwhelmingly foreign, the discussion of the producer surplus of such 
packages can be deferred until the section on tourism later in the document. 25 
Therefore, the gross benefit (revenue plus social surplus) of a Type 1 sport with N 
individual scheduled and ticketed events and two ticket price categories would be 
calculated with the following formula:  
N * ( p1q1 + p2q2 +  .75*( ½ q1 ( .5 + .15)p1 + ½ q2 ( .5 + .15)p2)   )  (eq.1) 
 
while the gross benefit of a Type 2 sport with N ticketed events and two ticket price 
categories would be calculated using the following formula: 
N * ( p1q1 + p2q2 +  .87*( ½*.75* q1 * .15*p1 + ½*.75* q2 * .15*p2)   )  (eq.2) 
 
Where: 
q1, q2 – number of publicly sold venue seats in each price category 
p1, p2 – estimated price of venue seats in each price category 
Additional considerations 
There are two additional considerations: seating at Olympic events which is not 
sold to the public, and the economic effect of scalpers. 
The Vancouver Bid Book does not explicitly list the numbers of seats available 
which are not for sale to the public, but presumably, there are such seats, which are given 
away to volunteers, VIPs, and Olympic sponsors.  As these seats are not included in the 
‘tickets sold’ data which was used above to derive demand curves for Olympic tickets, 
the surplus accruing to viewers in these “free” seats has not yet been accounted for. 
To correctly account for this surplus would require assumptions for the following: 
•  The number of free seats at each event.   (This can be calculated later, once the 
total number of tickets sold at each event is determined and compared to venue 
capacity). 26 
•  The quality (i.e. price category) of these seats.  These will all be assumed to be in 
the highest price category. 
•  The proportion of free seats at each event which are occupied.  For simplicity, we 
will assume that all of these seats are occupied.   
•  The proportion of the occupants of the free seats with standing.  This is difficult to 
ascertain.  On one hand, many of the occupants will presumably be local 
dignitaries and local volunteers (of whom there are expected to be 25,000)
17.  On 
the other hand, many members of the “Olympic family” will presumably also be 
given seats.  All in all, the ratio of “free seat” holders with standing will be 
assumed to be 50%. 
•  The WTP of those occupants.  Presumably, those users of free seats who have 
standing are either local dignitaries (i.e.: have reasonably high incomes) or are 
Olympic volunteers (i.e.: have a high degree of enthusiasm for the Games).  
Either way, they are likely to derive a fairly high amount of benefit from their 
Olympic experience, and so will be estimated to have a WTP of 50% greater than 
the official price of the highest ticket category. 
The end result is that additional surplus accruing to occupants of “free” seats at each 
event will be estimated with the following formula: 
S * (1 + .5) * p1 * .5   (eq.3) 
 
Where: 
S – number of free seats at the event 
p1 – price for top price category at each venue 
                                                 
17 As reported on the official website of the Vancouver Olympics:  
http://www.vancouver2010.com/en/Participation/VolunteerOpportunities 27 
Finally, the impact of scalping on the accounting must be considered.  As 
discussed, full data series for prices of tickets obtained in the aftermarket are obviously 
not available.  However, crude estimates of proportions of foreign/domestic involvement 
in the aftermarket, combined with our preceding calculations, might add usefully to our 
overall estimates.   
What is important here is not whether the participants in these transactions are 
“professional scalpers”, but whether each side in the transaction has standing. 
If a foreigner resells a ticket to another foreigner, or if a Canadian resells a ticket to 
another Canadian, such transactions are irrelevant in CBA, as they merely represent 
transfers rather than changes in social surplus.  On the other hand, there are two types of 
transactions that *do* result in changes in social surplus:   
1.  A Canadian sells to foreigners for a scalping price more than face value.  This 
increases benefit to Canada by difference between scalping price and face value 
of ticket.  In other words, this claws back some of the surplus lost.  The total gain 
in surplus resulting from such transactions over our previous calculations equals 
net profits for Canadian “scalpers” on ticket sales to foreigners. 
2.  Foreigner (without standing) obtains a ticket at face value, then resells it to a 
Canadian.  This is basically two transactions:  the first is the simple export of a 
ticket, where face value of the ticket accrues to Canada.  This transaction 
represents a gross benefit to Canada equal to the face value of the ticket, and has 
already been captured in our previous calculations.  The second transaction is the 
IMPORT of the (same) ticket.  The difference between the WTP of the Canadian 
purchaser and the price paid is the gain in surplus represented by this transaction 28 
(as the surplus gain of any import would be calculated).  (Note that the price paid 
in the resale of type 2 tickets may not be as high as the original face value, since 
the foreign scalper may simply have bought the ticket as a means of buying a type 
1 ticket.  This does not matter, and the surplus change from the resale transaction 
(Foreigner resells ticket to Canadian) should be treated as though we are 
importing a completely different good).  This type of transaction represents a 
surplus gain as well (over our previous calculations) equal to the difference 
between the willingness to pay for the tickets and the price collected (by the 
foreign seller). 
In practice, the accounting for these transactions could grow rather complicated.  
Blocks of tickets are initially sold to travel industry, sponsors, and other national 
Olympic committees.  All of these sales represent ‘export sales’ as in case 1 above.  
Many of the organizations who purchase such tickets end up reselling them: 
•  To local scalpers (as in case 2 above), at which point they might then be resold to 
other locals (irrelevant from a CBA perspective) or foreigners (yet another export 
as in case 1). 
•  To foreign scalpers (irrelevant from a CBA perspective), at which point they 
might be resold to other foreigners (irrelevant from a CBA perspective) or to 
locals (as in case 2 above). 
To account for this, we need to estimate the following: 
•  How many of the tickets that Canadians buy end up being “scalped” to foreigners, 
and for how much?   29 
•  How many of the tickets that foreigners buy end up being “scalped” back to 
Canadians, and for how much?   
For simplicity, only scalping transactions for Type 1 (high demand) tickets will be 
considered.  (Although it may well be that foreign buyers in particular are interested in 
scalping type 2 tickets, as they were likely “coerced” into buying many of these tickets as 
described above.)  It will also be assumed that each ticket is “scalped” from a foreigner to 
a Canadian or vice versa at most once (to avoid having to account for the net surplus 
generated by a ticket which is sold to a foreign company, which resells it to a Canadian 
scalper, who resells it again to a foreign tourist, etc...) 
Tickets purchased by Canadians but “scalped” to foreigners:  Recall that Canadian 
buyers are already assumed to be the initial purchasers of 75% of Type 1 tickets.  It will 
be assumed that 5% of those Type 1 tickets (i.e.: 3.75% of the total) that are sold to 
Canadians are subsequently scalped to foreigners.  This scalping is assumed to take place 
at “street” level, therefore these foreigners pay a fairly high price, halfway between their 
WTP and the face value of the ticket.  The effect of this transaction is that half of the 
surplus (i.e.: 50% of 3.75% = 1.875% of surplus) from the sales of these tickets now 
accrues to foreigners instead (and thus no longer counts), as the surplus for that ticket is 
divided equally between the Canadian scalper and the foreign spectator, instead of being 
entirely experienced by Canadians.   
Tickets purchased by foreigners but “scalped” to Canadians:  Meanwhile, foreign 
buyers are already assumed to be the initial purchasers 25% of Type 1.  Due to the high 
level of institutional buying by foreigners, it will be assumed that 20% of each type (i.e.: 
5% of all Type 1 tickets) are scalped back to Canadians (who might either be locals who 30 
intend to use the tickets or “professional scalpers” who do not), and that this is done in a 
“wholesale” way such that Canadians pay a fairly low price for these “scalped” tickets, 
50% below the face value.   
Therefore, of the 25% of surplus from type 1 tickets that accrues to foreigners (and 
thus is not counted in the analysis), 20% of this (i.e. 5% of total) would entirely revert 
back to Canadians.  In addition, because the tickets are assumed to be sold back to 
Canadians at 50% below face value, an additional surplus equal to 50% of the original 
revenue of these tickets (i.e. 50% of 5% or 2.5% of Type 1 revenue) accrues to 
Canadians.   
Since the 75% factor from equation 1 is being modified by (5%-1.875% = 3.125%), 
and adding the additional portion of revenue as surplus as described above, the gross 
benefit (revenue plus social surplus) of a Type 1 sport with N individual scheduled and 
ticketed events and two ticket price categories would become (with changes due to 
scalping in bold): 
N * 1.025 *( p1q1 + p2q2)+  .78125*( ½ q1 ( .5 + .15)p1 + ½ q2 ( .5 + .15)p2)   )  (eq.4) 
Conclusion: valuing the in-person spectacle 
Table 2 below summarizes all of the above discussion.  Some explanatory notes 
for the chart are as follows, with each number corresponding to an area of the chart.  (To 
clarify:  the value of the spectacle of the Vancouver Games is being estimated here, while 
data from the Turin Games is used to generate that estimate.) 
Data given from the Vancouver Bid Book: 
(1) Seating capacity at each venue. 
(2) Number of events of each sport type at each venue. 31 
(3) Fact that 1.8million tickets will be sold for the 170 sporting events alone
18 (not 
counting the opening/closing ceremonies) 
(4) Fact that expected revenue for sporting events AND opening/closing ceremonies is 
$218.222m CAD.
19 
Data from the Turin Games: 
(5) Ticket price categories for each event in Turin.  Some venues had two price 
categories, and others had three. 
(6)Event classifications (type 1/type 2) from the Turin Winter Games, where type 1 is 
expected to be a 'high demand' event (this applies to all price categories at a particular 
event), and type 2 is expected to be a low demand event.  (See preceding discussion).   
Note that most sports have more than one price category and or classification, i.e.:  
•  tickets to the preliminary rounds of curling at Turin cost either 40 (category 1) or 
20 Euros (category 2), and those preliminary rounds were designated ‘type 2’ 
(with no ticket purchase restrictions)   
•  Tickets to the final rounds of curling cost either 70 (category 1) or 40 (category 
2), with these final rounds designated as ‘type 1’ (that is, foreign purchasers were 
required to purchase a corresponding type 2 ticket for each type 1 ticket).   
Event/price category combinations are referred to as demand categories and are listed 
separately in the chart). 
(7) Amount of public and non-public seating at each venue (calculated)
 20    
                                                 
18 Source for 3 and 4: personal correspondence with VANOC 
19 Source: bid book, chapter 6.   
20 While the bid book categorizes each venue’s capacity as “general public tickets”, “seat kills including 
non-revenue tickets”, and “sponsors and broadcast guests”, it is not clear what these categories mean, and 
in any event, the number of “general public tickets” is not compatible with VANOC’s stated claim  that 
1.8m tickets will be sold for the sporting events alone.  Therefore, for the purposes of this paper I have 32 
(8) Estimate proportions of each venue at the Vancouver games that will be dedicated to 
seats in each of the various price categories (note that I assume this proportion is the 
same for all venues). 
(9) From those proportions, assuming similar price and demand categories exist for each 
event at Vancouver as at Turin, calculate the set of Canadian prices which would  
•  maintain the same relative prices for all demand categories of all events as in 
Turin 
•  produce the expected revenue for the Vancouver games (as mentioned in 4 above) 
given Vancouver venue public seating capacities estimated in (7) 
The venue high price/low price seating proportions in (8) was calibrated in order to 
make at least some of the ticket prices derived with this method come out at below $50 
and/or $100 dollars
21.  It was found that 70/30 splits (for events with two price 
categories) and 50/30/20 splits (for events with three price categories) made the various 
official estimates of revenue and tickets sold compatible with the price estimates 
generated in (9) 
(10) Calculate the consumer surplus for each demand category using the formulae in 
equations 1 and 2.   
(11)  Add the amount of surplus from “free seats” as in equation 3.  
(12)  Add the scalper adjustment for Type 1 events as described above.  It can be seen 
that under the assumptions made above, about $6m in extra economic benefit is generated 
from ticket resale activities. 
                                                                                                                                                 
ignored the categorizations provided in the bid book, and used the 1.8m figure to determined the amount of 
venue seating that must be “public” or “non public” (that is, occupied but not sold or counted as revenue).  
21 As per correspondence with VANOC, it is estimated that many of the tickets sold will be priced in these 
ranges. 33 
We can see from the bottom-right entry of Table 2 that the gross benefit of the in-
person viewing of the Olympic spectacle is not the estimated $218m in revenue, but 
rather the figure of approximately $306m, which takes into account all ticket revenue 
plus all social surplus accruing to paying and non-paying spectators with standing.34 
Event Number of events Total Seating Public Non seats sold to public demand  Est. revenue TOTAL SURPLUS SURPLUS SCALPER GROSS BENEFIT 
in each demand Capacity seating public in this demand type (6) (Vancouver) SUPLUS (for those with from free seats ADJUSTMENT OF IN-PERSON
category (2) (5) At Venue (1) (7) seating category (7) 1 2 3 1 2 3 C$ (9) standing) (10) (11) (12) SPECTACLE
(7) A B C D A + B + C + D
Curling 28 6000 5280 720 147840 40 20 45.49 $         22.74 $        2 5,716,111 $                 600,192            522,167                687,767             -                     6,926,045                           
3 6000 5280 720 15840 60 30 68.23 $         34.12 $        1 918,661 $                    298,565            223,924                110,534             34,536               1,287,654                           
1 6000 5280 720 5280 70 40 79.60 $         45.49 $        1 366,263 $                    119,036            89,277                  42,985               13,769               512,295                              
Figure Skating 5 15000 12660 2340 63300 280 170 70 318.41 $       193.32 $      79.60 $        1 14,756,635 $               4,795,906         3,596,930             2,794,055          554,757             21,702,377                         
4 15000 12660 2340 50640 300 190 100 341.15 $       216.06 $      113.72 $      1 13,072,219 $               4,248,471         3,186,353             2,394,904          491,434             19,144,910                         
1 15000 12660 2340 12660 370 250 120 420.76 $       284.30 $      136.46 $      1 4,088,668 $                 1,328,817         996,613                738,429             153,708             5,977,418                           
Short Track speed skating 5 15000 12660 2340 63300 90 70 40 102.35 $       79.60 $        45.49 $        1 5,326,785 $                 1,731,205         1,298,404             898,089             200,254             7,723,532                           
Long track speed skating 8 8000 6770 1230 54160 85 40 96.66 $         45.49 $        1 4,403,667 $                 1,431,192         1,073,394             713,354             165,550             6,355,965                           
4 8000 6770 1230 27080 95 50 108.03 $       56.86 $        1 2,509,782 $                 815,679            611,759                398,639             94,352               3,614,533                           
Freestyle Skiing 4 12000 10628 1373 42510 90 30 102.35 $       34.12 $        1 3,480,594 $                 1,131,193         848,395                421,411             130,849             4,881,248                           
2 12000 10628 1373 21255 60 20 68.23 $         22.74 $        2 1,160,198 $                 121,821            105,984                140,470             -                     1,406,652                           
Snowboard 4 12000 10628 1373 42510 90 35 102.35 $       39.80 $        1 3,553,106 $                 1,154,760         866,070                421,411             133,575             4,974,162                           
Hockey – Large Venue 1 17832 15051 2781 15051 350 200 398.01 $       227.44 $      1 5,220,398 $                 1,696,629         1,272,472             830,067             196,254             7,519,192                           
3 17832 15051 2781 45154 240 140 272.92 $       159.21 $      1 10,783,117 $               3,504,513         2,628,385             1,707,567          405,378             15,524,447                         
4 17832 15051 2781 60205 150 100 170.58 $       113.72 $      1 9,242,672 $                 3,003,868         2,252,901             1,422,972          347,467             13,266,012                         
1 17832 15051 2781 15051 120 70 136.46 $       79.60 $        1 1,797,186 $                 584,086            438,064                284,594             67,563               2,587,408                           
1 17832 15051 2781 15051 80 40 90.97 $         45.49 $        1 1,163,892 $                 378,265            283,699                189,730             43,755               1,681,075                           
21 17832 15051 2781 316077 80 40 90.97 $         45.49 $        2 24,441,732 $               2,566,382         2,232,752             3,984,322          -                     30,658,807                         
Hockey – Small 24 8000 6923 1077 166152 40 20 45.49 $         22.74 $        2 6,424,129 $                 674,534            586,844                881,816             -                     7,892,789                           
Alpine Downhill 6 15000 12660 2340 75960 110 30 125.09 $       34.12 $        1 7,428,706 $                 2,414,329         1,810,747             1,317,197          279,273             10,835,923                         
Various Slalom 6 15000 13200 1800 79200 110 30 125.09 $       34.12 $        1 7,745,570 $                 2,517,310         1,887,983             1,013,229          291,185             10,937,967                         
Biathalon 5 15000 13200 1800 66000 50 40 20 56.86 $         45.49 $        22.74 $        1 3,077,213 $                 1,000,094         750,071                383,799             115,684             4,326,766                           
2 15000 13200 1800 26400 50 40 20 56.86 $         45.49 $        22.74 $        2 1,230,885 $                 236,420            205,685                153,519             -                     1,590,090                           
Cross Country 4 15000 13200 1800 52800 70 60 30 79.60 $         68.23 $        34.12 $        1 3,542,548 $                 1,151,328         863,496                429,855             133,178             4,969,076                           
3 15000 13200 1800 39600 70 60 30 79.60 $         68.23 $        34.12 $        2 2,656,911 $                 496,482            431,939                322,391             -                     3,411,241                           
Ski Jumping 2 15000 13200 1800 26400 110 70 35 125.09 $       79.60 $        39.80 $        2 2,491,792 $                 520,124            452,508                337,743             -                     3,282,043                           
3 15000 13200 1800 39600 150 110 45 170.58 $       125.09 $      51.17 $        1 5,268,789 $                 1,712,356         1,284,267             690,838             198,074             7,441,968                           
Nordic combined 3 15000 13200 1800 39600 90 60 102.35 $       68.23 $        2 3,647,623 $                 383,000            333,210                414,503             -                     4,395,336                           
Bobsleigh 3 12000 10560 1440 31680 40 25 45.49 $         28.43 $        2 1,278,920 $                 134,287            116,829                147,379             -                     1,543,128                           
3 12000 10560 1440 31680 50 35 56.86 $         39.80 $        1 1,639,179 $                 532,733            399,550                184,223             61,623               2,284,575                           
Skeleton 2 12000 10560 1440 21120 50 35 56.86 $         39.80 $        1 1,092,786 $                 355,155            266,367                122,816             41,082               1,523,050                           
Luge 2 12000 10560 1440 21120 40 25 45.49 $         28.43 $        2 852,613 $                    89,524              77,886                  98,252               -                     1,028,752                           
2 12000 10560 1440 21120 50 35 56.86 $         39.80 $        1 1,092,786 $                 355,155            266,367                122,816             41,082               1,523,050                           
Opening Ceremonies 1 55300 46640 8660 46640 850 500 250 966.60 $       568.59 $      284.30 $      1 33,148,839 $               10,773,373       8,080,030             6,350,590          1,246,189          48,825,648                         
Closing Ceremonies 1 55300 46640 8660 46640 600 350 200 682.31 $       398.01 $      227.44 $      1 23,601,974 $               7,670,641         5,752,981             4,482,769          887,287             34,725,011                         
GRAND TOTAL 172 1,751,397 218,222,950 $             60,527,427 46,094,302 35,635,035 6,327,857 306,280,143         
(3) (9)
Price scaling factor calculations: (9)
Vancouver Revenue (if Turin prices were used) € 191,898,091.80
Vancouver Olympic ticket revenue (est, 2002 USD) 140,789,000.00 $       
 - in Canadian$ 218,222,950.00          
Price Scaling Factor (B/A) 1.137






proportion of non-public seats sold 
consistent with 1.8m seat total 70%
type 1 - high 0.5
type 1 - low 0.15
type 2 - q 0.7
Price Categories (9)
Vancouver 2010 - Estimated (CAD) Turin 2006 - Euros (5)
Price Categories
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Valuing the gross benefit of the televised Olympic spectacle 
 
Boardman’s conception of gross benefit of a project output – revenue plus change 
in social surplus – is the most conceptually useful place to start in valuing the televised 
Olympic Spectacle
22. 
Revenue   
According to the Bid Book, the IOC will collect an estimated $800m US from the 
various networks, and give half of that ($400m 2010 USD) to the host city.
23   
Appropriate
24 adjustment for inflation yields a figure of $348m 2002 USD, or $400m 
2002 CAD
25.    Since the IOC share of this money would be given to the IOC regardless 
of where the Olympics is, and since the costs the IOC incurs to administer the Olympics 
are not counted as part of the cost of hosting the Olympics, only the city’s share of the 
television revenue should be counted as project revenue. 
Changes in social surplus 
Most of the change in social surplus from the ability to watch the Games on 
television accrues to people who do not have standing – foreigners – and therefore can be 
ignored. 
                                                 
22 The alternative approach, as described in Jenkins (Cambridge 2004) would be to calculate the economic 
price of the televised spectacle, as opposed to its financial price. 
23 Some reports indicate that these initial estimates of television revenue for the Vancouver Winter Games 
may have been considerably lower than what is now expected. 
24 The Auditor General reports that VANOC “discounted the $400m amount appropriately, as instructed by 
the IOC” to arrive at the $348m 2002 USD figure.  It is apparent that this means adjusting only for 
inflation, rather than discounting to match the base year for the present value of all project costs and 
benefits.  As this ‘benefit’ will be realized in 2010, the same year to which this paper discounts other costs 
and benefits which do not occur in 2010, no further discounting or adjustment is necessary. 
25 An exchange rate of 1.15 CAD/USD (not 1.55) is used for this conversion.  As the original estimate was 
provided in USD there is no need to use an outdated exchange rate to recover an original Canadian figure. 36 
While the surplus which accrues to Canadians as the result of their being able to 
watch an Olympic Games on television is substantial
26, it cannot correctly be considered 
as a benefit of holding the Games in Canada, since the Games will always be held and 
televised from somewhere.  Therefore, this surplus would accrue to Canadian television 
viewers regardless of whether the Games were held in Canada or not.
27 
In conclusion, then, the value of the televised spectacle is one area where a 
correctly-performed CBA gives a result identical with the existing ‘economic impact’ 
studies – the value of the televised Games spectacle is exactly equal to the revenue given 
to the city by the IOC. 
                                                 
26 The Men’s Hockey Final in the 2002 Winter Games was the most watched television program in 
Canadian history. 
27 In fact, if any of the events were blacked-out in Canada in order to boost ticket sales, the surplus of the 
televised spectacle would actually be *less* than it would be otherwise and would count as a *cost* of the 
Games.  It is unlikely such black-outs will be in effect. 37 
Section 3 – The “Olympic Halo”: The Measurement of 
Non-Use Values of the Olympics 
"The Olympics, for some reason, seems to throw rational thought 
out the window. I call it the 'goose bump effect’.  The Olympics is 
built on this sentiment: 'I had goose bumps being at the Games, 
competing in the Games and so on.' It trumps all rational 
arguments." 
    Helen Lenskyj, Professor of Sociology, University of  
    Toronto
28 
 
The above quote seems to capture an important perceived benefit of the Olympic 
Games.  When the Olympic Games are awarded to a host city, the public enthusiasm that 
greets the news seems well out of proportion to any of the tangible benefits of the 
Olympic project which are enumerated elsewhere in this paper (such as the ability to 
attend Olympic sporting events locally).  It seems clear that one of the benefits many 
citizens derive from hosting the Games is the simple and unabashed pleasure of being 
validated as a ‘world-class city’ by the IOC, and the prospect having the attention of the 
entire world for several weeks.   
The willingness-to-pay (and therefore the benefit) of most project outputs can be 
inferred from the changes in prices and quantities resulting from the project.  However, 
the pleasure a resident takes from simply having the Olympics in their city is non-
rivalrous and non-excludable: a classic public good.  This value is not something that can 
be traded on markets; it is non-use value, also known in the literature as existence value.  
Since this value cannot, by definition, be captured in markets, economic theory tells us it 
will likely be underprovided without government subsidy.
29  
                                                 
28 As quoted in “Hosting the Olympics Doesn’t Always Make Cents”.  Capital Times, Madison Wisconsin 
August 3, 2004. 
29 This argument is not lost on Games proponents. 38 
It is not the proper role of the analyst who is endeavouring to conduct an honest 
and objective CBA to discount or dismiss these preferences, which are widely held by the 
public
30, but they do pose formidable measurement challenges.   
The literature on techniques for the measurement of existence value was 
concerned at first with the measurement of environmental valuation:  how much value 
does society place in the mere existence of a rare species or an old-growth forest, aside 
from the tourism/recreational opportunities it may afford?  While there has been as of yet 
no attempt to apply these techniques to the valuation of Olympic intangibles, and it 
would be well beyond the scope of this paper to attempt to do so in any rigorous way, 
there is a small related body of literature on the measurement of existence value for 
professional sports franchises, which we may draw on to provide rough estimates for the 
non-use benefits of hosting an Olympic Games.   
According to Boardman, most practitioners of CBA feel that contingent valuation 
surveys are the only way to elicit the magnitude of existence values
31, in spite of the fact 
that these surveys have numerous well-known shortcomings 
32.  Johnson et al (2001) used 
a contingent valuation survey to estimate the per capita yearly existence value of the 
Pittsburgh Penguins hockey team (that is, the value of the team above and beyond the 
surplus derived from viewing their games) to be $5.77.   
                                                 
30 It might be argued that the personal gratification that decision-makers derive from winning the Games is 
far more important to whether or not an Olympic bid is launched in the first place that the gratification 
derived by the public.  While intriguing, this observation is well beyond the scope of this paper. 
31 A second method, inferring non-use value from the behavioural traces found in the market consumption 
of related complementary items (i.e. secondary markets) has been proposed by Larson (1993). This point 
will be revisited in the next section, where the impact on the secondary markets related to tourism will be 
expressly addressed. 
32 Some of these disadvantages only occur in situations where existence value can be assigned to 
incremental units of the public good (i.e. “there are five units of habitat left, what would you pay to ensure 
the preservation of three more?”), and are mitigated somewhat when the surveys are used for the Olympics, 
which is an all-or-nothing undertaking. 39 
Any direct comparison between the yearly existence value of hosting a 
professional sports team (which is an ongoing enterprise) and hosting the Olympics 
(which is a one-time event) is problematic.  It is likely that the existence value of hosting 
any event is much higher if it is not a regular occurrence, in which case the $5.77 figure 
would be biased downwards from the “true” existence value of the Olympic Games.   
However, it is not clear how this bias would be corrected
33, so in the absence of a more 
appropriate figure, we will make use of Johnson’s result to estimate the value of the pride 
engendered by the Olympic Games.  Firstly, given the regional rivalries extant within 
Canada, it is assumed the Halo primarily applies to B.C. residents (residents of other 
provinces would largely see the Games as the “B.C. Games” and take much less pride in 
them.)   We might assume, then, that other residents of Canada would only feel the Halo 
one-half as strongly, i.e.:  $2.50 per capita.  As the population of British Columbia is 
approximately 4m and the remaining population of Canada is approximately 26m, under 
these assumptions the “Olympic Halo” would be worth: 4m x $5.77/per capita + 26m x 
$2.50/per capita, which works out to approximately $88m.  In the final section of this 
paper, this figure will be compared and contrasted with the level of public subsidy 
provided to the Olympics. 
                                                 
33 Correct currency conversion and discounting are also problematic, and none will be attempted here. 40 
Section 4 – “Economic Impact” and the Correct 
Valuation of Secondary Market Effects in Olympic CBA 
“The Province is responsible for estimating and paying for the 
Olympic-related costs that the IOC does not assign to the local 
Olympic Organizing Committee.  The Province expects the Games 
will stimulate economic activity, and resulting increases in tax 
revenues will help pay for its Games-related costs.” 
        Auditor-General of British Columbia 
 
As mentioned in the introduction, most studies of the Olympic Games concentrate 
on “economic impact” rather than net benefit as a CBA study would.  The contribution of 
tourism to “economic impact” in such studies is often substantial.    According to 
Intervistas (2002), under the “medium-high tourism scenario”
34, it is expected that the 
Olympic Games will induce 2.7m additional international tourist visits over the timespan 
2008-2015 (which is of course much longer than the Games themselves).  If this 
forecasted scenario is accurate, the Intervistas study estimates the total “economic 
impact” of this induced tourism to be $2.2bn.  
What is the relevance of these “induced” economic effects in CBA?  In the 
cost/benefit literature, the various demands by induced Olympic visitors for restaurant 
meals, accommodations, and so on are examples of second-round effects, also known as 
secondary, spillover, pecuniary, indirect, or side effects.  The Olympic project concerns 
itself only with stadiums, roads, housing, and security (these might be called primary 
                                                 
34 The Intervistas study names four “tourism scenarios”, namely “low”, “medium”, “medium-high”, and 
“high”, without providing any estimated probabilities for each of the outcomes.  As the “medium-high” 
scenario is often used as the point estimate of Olympic tourism, this paper will use that scenario as its 
starting point as well.  Again, it is assumed that such estimates are trustworthy, as the purpose of this paper 
is to conduct some elements of a methodologically sound CBA (as opposed to economic impact) study, 
rather than to second-guess the data and estimates provided by others.  However, it should be noted that the 
probability of the various tourist outcomes are considered to be contingent on additional tourism marketing 
efforts in conjunction with the 2010 Games.    In other words, it is not entirely correct to attribute the 
benefits of additional tourism (however measured) to the Olympics.  Since the costs and scope of such 
additional tourism marketing efforts are not being considered in this paper, the conclusions of this section 
should be viewed with the appropriate degree of caution. 41 
markets), but the markets for hotel stays and restaurant meals (called secondary markets) 
are affected nonetheless.  How should these secondary effects of the Olympic Games be 
treated in an Olympic CBA?  
This section will briefly outline the generally accepted CBA methodology for 
secondary markets, discuss its applicability to the Olympic context, and then reinterpret 
some of the data from the Intervistas study in a way which is consistent with that 
methodology. 
To begin, consider a highly simplified version of the Olympics which creates as 
its single output a generic “Olympic experience”, and also boosts demand in a single 
secondary market for “hotel stays”.  Assuming constant marginal costs (to allow 
consideration of consumer surplus only), perfect competition, and no distortions 
(including externalities), the two markets might be represented by Figure 6.
 35 
 
Figure 6: Primary and Secondary Markets 
 
A standard finding in CBA practice is that if three conditions are met: 
1.  the change in consumer surplus in the primary market is already being measured,  
2.  There are no distortions in the secondary market 
                                                 
35 The treatment here expands on the usual treatment in CBA texts by using graphs to explicitly display the 
‘double counting’ of benefits in primary and secondary markets. 42 
3.  There are no price changes in the secondary market 
we should NOT measure consumer surplus created by new demand induced in the 
secondary markets – to do otherwise would be double counting.
36   We can now ask if 
each of these conditions are fulfilled in the context of Olympic CBA. 
Is all surplus in primary markets already being measured? 
In order to answer this question, it is important to first identify the primary 
markets (i.e. the project outputs) which induce the tourism in the first place.  The 
Olympic Spectacle (the net benefit of which has been estimated in section 2 of this paper) 
would seem to be the obvious candidate.  Certainly, any secondary market effects during 
the Games could probably be attributed to the effects of the Spectacle alone, and thus be 
estimated in the standard way using the assumption that all surplus in the primary 
markets is being captured.  However, as mentioned in the first paragraph of this section, 
not all of the induced tourist visits which are ascribed to the Olympic Games actually 
occur during the Olympics.  What are the ‘primary goods’ which induced these “before 
and after the Games” effects?  Can we be sure that the surplus changes in secondary 
markets before/after the Games can be ignored? 
There are some potential approaches to the problem of secondary markets before 
and after the Games.  The first solution, if a primary good which induces demand in 
                                                 
36 Referring to Figure 6, if the secondary market (hotels) did not exist, the demand for the Olympic 
experience itself would be lower, represented by the dotted line, and the consumer surplus from the 
Olympic experience would only be A.  (The reader is invited to imagine how the desirability, and hence the 
willingness to pay, of the “Olympic Experience” would be affected if there were no hotels in the area!)  We 
see that the existence of the hotel market does not directly affect the Olympic experience but inflates the 
WTP for the Olympic experience all the same. The change of consumer surplus engendered by this project 
can be divided into two components:  The first is the contribution of the Olympic experience itself (A), and 
the second is that of the hotel market (B).  However, both of these contributions are already reflected by the 
demand curve for the Olympic experience itself, and to count the surplus gains in the secondary market 
would be to double-count the amount of consumer surplus contribution (B) of the hotel market. 
 43 
secondary markets cannot be identified or analyzed, would be to count some of the 
surplus change in the secondary markets as net benefit (since not all of the surplus change 
in the primary markets is being identified, this is not “double counting”)
37.   
The second solution, and the one that will be followed here, is to posit some other 
good (namely “the Halo” discussed in section 3) as an additional “primary good” which 
induces demand in tourist markets, and ensure that the surplus change in that market is 
being captured.  Although the Halo disregards the surplus which accrues to those tourists 
from outside of Canada, this is not a problem, since CBA analysis ignores surplus which 
accrues to people from outside Canada in the first place.  Therefore, this analysis will 
proceed as though all surplus is being captured in primary markets. 
Price changes in secondary market 
If the constant marginal cost assumption in the secondary market is relaxed, the 





                                                 
37 As alluded to in the previous section on “the Halo”, Larson (1993) suggested exactly this technique as an 
alternative to contingent valuation surveys for the measurement of the otherwise invisible primary good 
known as “existence value”.  
38 Boardman follows a different treatment, by using the concept of an ‘effective’ or ‘observed’ demand 
curve (i.e. the demand curve before and after the introduction of the good into the market) in the primary 
market, which approximates the shaded area in the secondary market.  This also allows the analyst to 
ignore the secondary market, but this approach is not helpful when considering a primary market which is 
newly created by the project under analysis, as we are here, since there is no ‘before’ and ‘after’ demand to 
observe. 44 
 
Figure 7: Primary and Secondary Markets with Price Changes in the Secondary Markets 
 
Since a price increase causes a loss of CS and a smaller gain in PS as in area C, 
the standard CBA approach treats the shaded triangle above as the net change (in fact, a 
loss) in surplus in the secondary market, to be counted in addition to the change of 
surplus in the primary market.   
Jenkins provides the following formula (note that the P
0 – P
1 term is in fact 
negative) 





However, this assumes that all consumers in the secondary markets have standing, 
and if this is not the case then some of the lost consumer surplus in area C does NOT 
offset the gains in producer surplus in the same area.  Some of the producer surplus gain 
in area C should be counted as a gain (note the positive sign of the P
1 – P
0 term below) if 
the proportion of consumers in the secondary market with standing is X, the formula 
should then be: 
Gross Benefits = benefits in primary market  








0)  (eq.6) 
Graphically, this is represented as follows: 45 
 
Figure 8: Secondary Market effects (where X% of consumers have standing) 
Distortions in secondary markets 
In the context of Olympic CBA, secondary market distortions exist in the form of  
consumption taxes on hotel stays, restaurant meals, etc. 
Jenkins, assuming constant marginal costs as in Figure 6, graphically derives the 
following formula:
 39 
 Gross Benefits = benefits in primary market + (Q
2 – Q
0)T   (eq.7) 
 
 
Figure 9:  Secondary Markets with Distortions 
 
                                                 
39 As an alternative approach to dealing with secondary markets in CBA, a general term Wx
d Px
m d* can be 
added to the economic price of the primary market good to account for demand that is diverted to (in the 
case of project inputs) or from (in the case of project outputs) the rest of the economy.  In that term, Wx
d is 
the proportion of project output which represents increased demand for the primary good (and thus less 
demand for everything else in the economy), and d* is the general level of distortion in the economy.  This 
technique assumes that there are no price changes in the rest of the economy as the result of project output, 
but since this assumption does not hold for goods which are close substitutes or complements of project 
output (the very goods we are considering in this section) now, this method is too limited to be useful here.   46 
Combining the effects of distortions and price changes is straightforward, as shown 
in Figure 10 below (where the N subscript denotes demand net of taxes, the G subscript 
denotes demand inclusive of all taxes, and the 0 and 1 superscripts denote without and 
with the Games respectively): 
 
Figure 10: Secondary Markets with price changes and distortions 
Gross Benefits = benefits in primary market 










0)T  (eq.8) 
 
Note that Q
1 is the new quantity demanded as it would have been without price 
changes, and a close inspection of Figure 10 will reveal that this quantity cannot be 
observed and must necessarily be estimated.  On the other hand, Q
2 represents the actual 
observed quantity with price changes.  We will return to this problem of estimating Q
1 
shortly. 
Measuring secondary surplus generated by Olympic tourism – 
general approach 
With the theory out of the way, we can now proceed with estimating the surplus 
generated in secondary markets by the Olympic Games.  So far in the discussion, the 47 
identity of the good in the secondary markets has been left unspecified.  Secondary 
market analysis for tourism is complicated by the fact that there is not one single 
“secondary good”, but many, such as hotel visits, restaurant stays, and transportation.  
This problem can be solved by treating "tourism goods" as a sort of composite good 
which costs $1 per unit normally before taxes.  P
0 is then simply $1, and Q
0 is the amount 
that is normally spent (before taxes) on such goods per period. 
The next consideration is which of the scenarios described above (no price 
changes, price changes and distortions, or distortions only) are relevant.  BC currently has 
consumption taxes imposed both at the provincial and federal levels, and we may safely 
assume that these will remain throughout the period in question at 7.5% provincially and 
5% federally (assuming the recently announced Federal GST cut proceeds as scheduled).  
Therefore, distortions will always need to be accounted for. 
What about price changes?  As discussed in the introduction, the impact of 
induced tourism is expected to extend over the period 2008-2015.  According to 
Intervistas, under the medium-high tourist visits scenario there will be 2.7m international 
induced tourist visits in total, of which 600k will occur in 2010 itself.  This implies that 
the remaining 2.1m visits which occur before/after the Olympics would be spread over 7 
years, for an average of 300k additional visits per year.  Since, according to Tourism BC, 
the base of tourism in BC is 10 million international visitors per year
40, it may be safely 
assumed that this low level of additional visits before and after the games will not be 
sufficient to generate any price changes in the relevant markets, in which case equation 7 
may be used to assess the surplus changes for those visits. 
                                                 
40 As reported by Intervistas.  48 
However, during the Games year itself, 600k additional international visitors will 
descend on Vancouver, a large number of them during the short period the Games are 
being held.  Because the Olympics only lasts a few weeks, it is unlikely the private sector 
will add extra capacity just for the Olympics (although some facilities will presumably be 
moved ahead in time to handle the pre/post Olympic “shoulders” of extra induced 
demand from 2008-2015.)   As a result, there will certainly be an impact on prices 
charged in various tourism-related sectors during the Games itself.  Stories of "price 
gouging" during the Olympics are legion in every Olympic host city.  It will be assumed 
that the price rise will be 25% in the Lower Mainland/Whistler area during the Games 
themselves.   This, combined with the presence of distortions, implies that equation 8 
should be used for the secondary market effects during the Games themselves. 
While this paper does not contain a full-blown distributional analysis, it is 
interesting to consider the question of how this extra surplus is distributed.  If prices get 
bid up and stay up for the long run, over time factor prices rise, and the end result is that 
this increase in producer surplus winds up going to the factors of production, not the 
producers.  However, if prices get bid up in the short run (as is the case in the Olympics), 
factor prices do not correspondingly rise, and the increase in producer surplus is entirely 
economic rent.
41 
Secondary surplus for tourist activity during the Games 
Now we will attempt to use the total amount of induced tourist spending during 
the Games (the best available estimate for this is from Intervistas, which was prepared 
                                                 
41 This is no doubt part of the reason for the enthusiastic support that the Games receive from many in the 
business community. 49 






for equation 8, as shown in Figure 11. 
 
 
Figure 11: From "Economic Impact" to Net Benefit in Secondary Markets 
 
As we are treating "tourism goods" as a composite good which costs $1 per unit 
normally (P
0), a price change of 25% implies that the good will cost $1.25 during the 
Olympics (P
1).   
To estimate the initial quantity Q
0 of the “composite tourist good” consumed, the 
concept of “Tourist GDP” may be used.  According to StatsCan (2006), Tourism GDP “is 
the unduplicated value of production, within the boundaries of a region, of goods and 
services purchased by tourists.”   
According to the above reference, tourist GDP in Canada was $5.1bn (nominal 
2006 dollars, NSA
42) in Q1 2006.  Unfortunately there is no data for provincial tourist 
GDP available from StatsCan, and it will be assumed that ¼ of all Canadian tourist GDP 
for the quarter was generated in BC ($1.25bn).  Here, we are only looking at the period 
for which induced tourist spending is sufficient to induce price changes (i.e. during the 
                                                 
42 Given that the Olympics occur in the same quarter as the data we are using,  it is undesirable to 
seasonally adjust our base figure.  Also, this figure is before indirect taxes, and thus is appropriate to use as 
the measure of Q
0 before taxes, as in Figure 10 above. 50 
Games themselves), therefore we want to look at a period shorter than one quarter.  A 
third of a quarter (a month) yields an approximate figure for Q
0 of (1/3 * $1.25bn) = 
$420m. 
As for X, Q
1 (unobservable, must be estimated), and Q
2 (directly observable) 
these can be derived from estimates of total induced tourist spending during the Games, 
and total induced tourist spending during the Games by people without standing, as 
described below. 
We see from inspection of Figure 11 that Q
2 satisfies equation 9 below, given the 
estimates for P0, P1, and Q0 already discussed.   




0   (eq.9) 
X would be found from the formula 
X = Induced spending by consumers with standing/All induced spending  (eq.10) 
Finally, to estimate the unobservable Q
1, it would be assumed that the new 
demand curve for tourist goods is relatively inelastic (.5) over the relevant range, as 
consumers in the grip of a once-in-a-lifetime bout of “Olympic Fever” are unlikely to be 
overly concerned about price.   
Estimates of tourist spending can (with difficulty) be derived from the Intervistas 
data.  The Intervistas data categorizes participants in Olympic-related secondary markets 
as follows: 
•  Local Spectators live in the local area and do not require accommodation.  As 
Intervistas does, the secondary market impact of the ‘local spectators’ category is 
ignored.  Local spectators don’t need hotels, and it is assumed that if their use of 
other tourist related goods and services does not change appreciably as a result of 51 
the Olympics.  In other words, their spending is already counted in the base 
tourism GDP figure, and may be ignored. 
•  Resident Visitors. Residents of BC from outside the immediate Games area 
visiting the games who require paid overnight accommodation, minus induced 
resident exits (residents of BC who “would have” vacationed in BC but leave to 
avoid the Games).  Their spending is treated differently than that of local 
spectators because they require paid overnight accommodation, and thus spend 
more on secondary tourist goods than they normally would.  
•  External Visitors - athletes, media, Olympic officials. 
•  External tourists are tourists from outside BC who visit the Olympic area, either 
before, during, or after the Games, as a result of the Games, minus “induced non-
visits”.   
Various adjustments need to be made when using this spending data: 
1.  Standing – the study takes the provincial perspective and so no distinction is made 
for non-BC Canadians.  Based on the discussion in section 2 of this document, it 
will usually be assumed here that 30% of all external spending (whether visitors 
or tourists) is by non-BC Canadians (with standing) while the remainder is by 
non-Canadians without standing.
43   
2.  It is not clear to what extent the Intervistas estimates for tourist visits and induced 
resident exits take into account the redirection of demand from other parts of 
Canada and/or other years.  What portion of induced tourist visits (or induced 
resident exits from)  the Olympic city would have occurred anyway, but in 
                                                 
43 For many of these categories, Intervistas supplies more complicated estimates of proportion of 
Canadians/non-Canadians in the spending figures, but for simplicity the 30% figure will generally be used. 52 
another year?  What portion would have been to another part of the host nation 
instead?  It appears that such considerations are part of the motivation for 
Intervistas’ largely undocumented use of “multipliers” in order to obtain 
economic impact.
44  For simplicity, this paper will only adjust the external tourists 
category, to account for those who change the timing of their visit (i.e. they would 
have visited Vancouver/Whistler in 2011, but choose to visit in 2010 instead to 
see the Games) and for those who would have visited another part of Canada if 
not for the Olympics.  The external tourists number is downward 15% for each 
factor (30% in total).  No adjustment for redirected demand is made to the 
‘External visitors’ category, as these are largely “working visits” which do not 
change the scheduling of vacation trips. 
3.  Timing of visits during the Games year – Intervistas provides estimates on total 
tourist visits and spending in the Games year, but makes no distinction between 
induced spending during the 2-week period of the Games itself, and induced 
spending during the remainder of the Games year (2010).  I will assume 
arbitrarily that 50% of induced Games year spending as estimated by Intervistas 
takes place during the Games itself (and is thus subject to the price increases 
discussed above), while 50% does not.    
The raw Intervistas data for number of visitors, days per visit, and spending per day 
(and therefore total spending), along with the various modifications discussed above, is 
shown in Table 3 below.
                                                 
44 Which, in turn, explains why figures for total spending induced in secondary markets as shown in Table 
3 and Table 4 combined of roughly $3bn (based on data in the Intervistas report) exceed figures for 
economic impact of tourism of $2.2bn (taken from Intervistas as well). 53 
Days $ per day Total Spending Proportion of Total Spending
per visit this category By People With
(as per Intervistas) (Adjusted) with standing? Standing
Resident Visitors (BC residents outside the Vancouver/Whistler area)
During the Games (Feb 2010) 23,500                         23,500           8 200 37,600,000 $                                 100% 37,600,000 $                              
External Visitors (non-tourists)
During the Games (Feb 2010)
Media 7,000                           7,000             20 100 14,000,000 $                                 30% 4,200,000 $                                
Atheletes (2) 4,500                           4,500             10 100 4,500,000 $                                   30% 1,350,000 $                                
Olympic Officials (2) 2,000                           2,000             20 250 10,000,000 $                                 10% 1,000,000 $                                
Sponsors 3,000                           3,000             20 500 30,000,000 $                                 30% 9,000,000 $                                
External Tourists -                 - $                                              - $                                          
During the Games (Feb 2010) (1) 600,000                       210,000         10 329 690,900,000 $                               30% 207,270,000 $                            
Total Induced Spending During the Games (A) 787,000,000 $                     (B) 260,420,000 $                  
(1) Intervistas estimated 600k induced visits during Games year.  50% of these during games - 30% reduction for deflected demand from other years/parts of Canada = 210k
(2) Intervistas asserted that spending by visiting atheletes and Olympic officials should not be counted, as expenses for these groups are covered by VANOC
    (however, the purpose of this exercise is to measure surplus, not spending)
   (The surplus gains in secondary markets are real, regardless of who pays for them, and should be counted).
RESULTS
Q0, as calculated in text 420,000,000                               
T (as discussed in text) 12.5%
Estimated price elasticity E for composite tourist good during Olympics (as discussed in text) 0.5
(equation 9): Q2 = (Total Induced Spending (A) + Q0*P0)/P1  (see text for discussion) 965,600,000                               
(equation 10) Proportion X of all induced Olympic Spending During the Games by people with "standing" in the CBA  (B/A) 33%
Estimation of Q1 (% change in Q1 from Q2 found by E*20%)    (see discussion in text)  1,062,160,000                            
(equation 8)  benefits in secondary market   = (1 – X) (P1 – P0)(Q0+Q2)/2 + ½ (P0 – P1)(Q1 – Q0) + (Q2 – Q0)T   103,817,746 $                            





Table 3: Intervistas Data and related calculations for Olympic-Induced tourist spending during the Games 54 
We see from Table 3 that the shaded area of Figure 11, representing total induced 
spending during the Olympics Games, is $787m, while induced spending by visitors with 
standing is $260m.  Applying the induced spending figure to equation 9 gives an estimate 
for Q
2 (the number of “units of the composite tourist good” sold during the Games 
themselves, not total revenue) of 965m.  Is this reasonable?  Recall that the base figure 
(Q
0) for tourist good consumption for one winter month in BC was estimated to be 420m 
“units”, so an estimate of 965m implies that hotels, restaurants, and other tourist-oriented 
industries will be twice as busy during the Games as they otherwise would be, even with 
the estimated 25% price increase.  Is there enough spare capacity in “tourist good 
producing” industries to make this possible?  The answer is likely yes.  The Games will 
be held both in the ski resort of Whistler and the nearby city of Vancouver in February 
2010, and while February is the height of “tourist season” at Whistler, it is definitely not 
so in Vancouver; on the aggregate, a doubling of “tourist good” output is probably 
possible.   
As for Q
1 (the unobservable quantity demanded of the composite tourist good if 
its  price did NOT change from $1 to $1.25 during the Olympic Games), our previous 
estimate of price elasticity for such goods (.5) implies a percentage change in Q
1 of 
(-.5)(20%) = 10%, and a figure for Q1 of 1.062bn “units”. 
Finally, our proportion X of induced spending incurred by people with standing is 
seen from Table 3 to be 33%.   
At last, we see that the correctly-calculated secondary market benefit from 
Olympic-induced tourism during the Games themselves is a mere $103m.  As all of this 
benefit is realized during the “base year” of 2010, no further discounting is required. 55 
Secondary surplus for tourist activity before/after the Games 
Recall that even before and after the Games, an estimated 1.68m extra visitors 
will visit the Games area as the result of the Olympics (for details of this estimate, see 
Table 4).  Estimating the quantity of extra surplus in secondary markets by these visits is 
a relatively simple problem, as neither price changes nor the question of how many 
market participants have “standing” need not be considered.  We need only use Figure 9 
and equation 7 as our guide, although it is important to clarify the time period that the 
simple supply/demand diagram is meant to represent.   
Intervistas asserts that the impact of tourism is felt from 2008 to 2015 (including 
visits during 2010 which fall outside the Games, assumed to be 50% of the Games year 
visits), therefore some assumptions about the timing of these visits is necessary in order 
to discount the benefits of these visits to 2010.  The assumptions of proportions of overall 
visits for each year are shown in table 4.   
We can define Q
0 in our market as the amount of tourist goods sold in BC from 
2008-2015.  Recalling our previous estimate for tourist GDP for BC in Q1 2006 of 
1.25bn, and making the simplifying assumption that this base figure would remain 
constant over the years 2008-15 in the absence of the Games, we obtain a figure for Q
0 of 
8*1.25bn = 10bn. 
Using a similar methodology as in the previous section, Table 2 tells us that an 
additional 2.3bn units of the composite tourist good will be consumed as the result of the 
Olympics, yielding a figure for Q2 of 12.3bn “units” of the composite tourist good.
45  At 
                                                 
45 It can easily be seen that the quantity (Q
2  -Q
0) is simply equal to “induced spending” which we are 
already calculating directly.  The only benefit of looking at Q
2  and Q
0 directly is to ensure that the amount 
of induced spending for tourism outside of the Games is low enough to assume that no price changes are 
likely to take place as a result of it. 56 
a T of 12.5%, equation 7 applied to the spending for each year (and then discounted 
appropriately at 10% to bring all values to present value as of 2010) yields a figure for 
secondary surplus for induced tourism before/after the Games of $258m.   
Conclusion – net benefits of tourism 
Combining properly discounted figures for net benefit of tourism both during and 
before/after the games yields a figure of (258m + 103m), or $361m.  This figure, while 
impressive, is a far cry from the billion-dollar figures for “economic impact of tourism” 
touted by Games proponents, and should be set against the full spectrum of costs and 
benefits for the Olympic Games, which the next and final section of this paper will do. 57 
Days $ per day Total Induced Spending
per visit (Undiscounted)
(as per Intervistas) (Adjusted)
Resident Visitors (BC residents outside the Vancouver/Whistler area)
Before/After Games (2008-2015) 34,500                          34,500            2 100 6,900,000 $                                   (2)
External Visitors (non-tourists)
Before/After Games (2008-2015)
Media 1,100                            1,100              2 100 220,000 $                                      (2)
Olympic Officials 1,000                            1,000              5 250 1,250,000 $                                  
Sponsors 1,500                            1,500              1 500 750,000 $                                     
External Tourists
Before/After Games (2008-2015) (1), of which…. 2,100,000                     1,680,000      
2008 (5% of total visits) 84,000            7 200 117,600,000 $                              
2009 (5%"") 84,000            7 200 117,600,000 $                              
2010 (20% outside of the Games Period itself (February)) 336,000          7 200 470,400,000 $                              
2011 (20%) 336,000          7 200 470,400,000 $                              
2012 (20%) 336,000          7 200 470,400,000 $                              
2013 (15%) 252,000          7 200 352,800,000 $                              
2014 (10%) 168,000          7 200 235,200,000 $                              
2015(5%) 84,000            7 200 117,600,000 $                              
Total Induced Spending Before/After the Games 2,361,120,000 $                           
(1) Intervistas estimated 2.1m induced tourist visits during years 2008-15 (not incl. 2010). Move 50% of 2010 visits to this category (300k) - 30% redirected demand adjustment = 1.68m
(2) No attempt is being made to specify the timing of spending in Resident Visitor or External Visitor categories, it is all assumed to take place in 2010
Q0, as calculated in text 10,000,000,000                            
T (as discussed in text) 12.5%
Q2 = Total Induced Spending + Q0 12,361,120,000                            
Discounted to 2010
@10%
(equation 7)  benefits in secondary market in 2008 = 2008 induced spending * T 14,700,000 $                                 17,787,000 $                     
(equation 7)  benefits in secondary market in 2009 = 2009 induced spending * T 14,700,000 $                                 16,170,000 $                     
(equation 7)  benefits in secondary market in 2010 = 2010 induced spending (see note 2) * T 59,940,000 $                                 59,940,000 $                     
(equation 7)  benefits in secondary market in 2011 = 2011 induced spending * T 58,800,000 $                                 53,454,545 $                     
(equation 7)  benefits in secondary market in 2012 = 2012 induced spending * T 58,800,000 $                                 48,595,041 $                     
(equation 7)  benefits in secondary market in 2013 = 2013 induced spending * T 44,100,000 $                                 33,132,983 $                     
(equation 7)  benefits in secondary market in 2014 = 2014 induced spending * T 29,400,000 $                                 20,080,596 $                     
(equation 7)  benefits in secondary market in 2015 = 2015 induced spending * T 14,700,000 $                                 9,127,543 $                       
NET BENEFIT OF INDUCED TOURIST SPENDING BEFORE/AFTER GAMES 258,287,709 $           
In Each Category
(as per Intervistas)
Number of Induced Visitors
 
Table 4:  Intervistas Data and Calculations:  Induced Tourist Visits before/after Games   58 
Section 5 - Are the Olympics a Worthwhile Public 
Project? 
“Economic theory casts doubt on a substantial windfall for the 
host city from the Olympic Games.  Cities competing with one 
another for the Games would theoretically bid until their expected 
return reached zero.” 
        Rob Baade 
 
While the main thrust of this paper has been devoted to providing estimates for 
particular Event Benefits of the Olympic Games, namely the Spectacle, the Halo, and the 
net benefit of stimulated tourism, it is worthwhile to try to integrate these estimates 
together with other published figures for Event Costs, to provide an approximation of the 
true costs and benefits of the 2010 Vancouver Winter Games from a correct CBA 
perspective.  In particular, this section provides an opportunity to enumerate some 
additional considerations in Olympic CBA which this paper did not have space to 
address.   
Event Costs Event Benefits
Operations Costs listed in Bid Book 1507 Televised spectacle (section 2) 400
Risk 139 In person spectacle (section 2) 306
Bid Costs 35 "Halo" (section 3) 88
Additional Operating Costs paid for by Province Induced tourism (section 4) 361
   Medical 13 Sponsorship
   Security 88   International Sponsorship 130
  Local Sponsorship 395
Congestion Externalities N/A
Total Event Costs 1782 Total Event Benefits 1680
Event Benefits - Event Costs -101
(Note: Net Infrastructure Cost was not quantified in this paper, but would also be charged against
the Olympics as discussed in section 2)
              All figures in 2002 $m CAD. 
Table 5: Summary of Olympic costs and benefit estimates   59 
Event Costs 
As described in section 1, Event Costs are those which are directly required to attain 
the Event Benefits of hosting the Games, but are not required to attain the Infrastructure 
Benefits.  Many of these costs are directly incurred by the organizing committee and 
therefore are listed in the committee’s “Olympic Budget” contained in the Bid Book.  No 
attempt has been made here to compute economic (as opposed to financial) values for 
these costs: published figures have been taken directly from the Bid Book.  However, a 
number of Event Costs are omitted from the Olympic Budget but are included here: 
•  The cost of the original bid ($35m) 
•  Additional operating costs which are the responsibility of the province, namely 
security and additional medical facilities. 
•  Risk: it is the responsibility of the host region to cover any shortfalls in the 
operating budget of the Organizing Committee.  Such estimates are inherently 
uncertain, and the contingency allowance made by the Province is listed here.
46 
•  Congestion externalities were not estimated, although it might be argued that 
these are partially captured by considering the secondary impact of BC residents 
who leave the province to avoid the Games. 
As discussed in the Introduction, a meaningful comparison of Event Costs and Event 
Benefits requires that they be discounted or cumulated to a common base year if their 
timing differs.  Most Event Costs are incurred in 2010 and therefore do not need any 
discounting in order to be compared with the present values of Event Benefits.  However, 
to the extent that some Event Costs (such as advertising, salaries of VANOC employees, 
                                                 
46 It should be noted that the Auditor General’s report states: “we have been unable to find a reasoned 
methodology to support that amount, and are concerned that it may be insufficient.”   60 
etc) are incurred before 2010, the figures used understate the present values of those costs 
as of 2010.  This consideration applies even more forcefully to Infrastructure Costs and 
Benefits, where the costs precede the non-Olympic benefits by many years. 
Event Benefits 
The primary benefits of holding the Olympic Games are the benefit of the 
Spectacle, the Halo, and the secondary market effects of induced tourism, and these are 
estimated in sections 2 through 4.   
In addition, a very large component of VANOC’s projected revenue is derived 
from sponsorship, which is the exchange of goods or money in return for the right for a 
company to associate itself with the Olympics.  This “benefit” that is generated by the 
Olympics can be thought of as the corporate counterpart to the “Halo” of  section 4, 
which considered the value of “being associated with the Olympics” for residents of the 
host region themselves.  However, the Auditor General points out that a very large 
component of sponsorship “revenue” actually consists of goods provided for free by the 
sponsoring corporation, and since these are usually valued at full retail price rather than 
their true economic value, these sponsorship figures should be interpreted with a healthy 
degree of scepticism.
47  That being said, the fact that most of these sponsorship benefits 
are generated before 2010 means that here too, the figures used understate the present 
values of these benefits as of 2010. 
                                                 
47 Another reason for scepticism:  the Auditor General’s report suggests that targets for local sponsorship 
are extremely optimistic.   61 
Conclusion 
As we see from Table 5 above, even the most generous measure of net benefit of 
the Olympics – Event Benefits minus Event Costs – is negative (-$101m), although by a 
lesser amount than was anticipated at the beginning of the project.  This figure is 
“helped” by fully evaluating the extra surplus from the spectacle and the Halo.   
However, there are a number of factors which push the actual net benefit of this 
much-celebrated project even further into the red.  The first, of course, are the 
infrastructure costs discussed in section 1.  While this paper did not rigorously assess 
these, a casual perusal of the Infrastructure Costs and the non-Olympic Infrastructure 
Benefits which might be expected reveals that the net contribution of Infrastructure to the 
Olympic “bottom line” will be negative by hundreds of millions of dollars.  While these 
costs are obvious, the standard counter-argument is that they will be offset by the 
“economic impact” of the Games.  However, section 4 of this paper revealed that 
“economic impact”, when correctly accounted for, is not nearly as large as is generally 
assumed.  When combined with the substantial upside risks inherent in costs of public 
works projects
48, the expected overall net benefit of hosting an Olympic Games is 
substantially negative. 
 
                                                 
48 Redlin (2003) quotes research by Bend Flyvberg of Aalborg University, who has found that 90% of large 
public works projects exceed their initial cost estimates.   62 
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